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RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Modelling the risk of transfusion
transmission from travelling donors
Tonderai Mapako1,2†, Welling Oei3,4*†, Marinus van Hulst1,5, Mirjam E. Kretzschmar4,6,7 and Mart P. Janssen3,4
Abstract
Background: The EUFRAT (European Up-Front Risk Assessment Tool) was developed as an online risk assessment
tool (http://eufrattool.ecdc.europa.eu) to help decision-makers assess the transmission risk of emerging infectious
diseases (EID) through blood transfusion. The aim of this study is to extend the methodology developed in the
EUFRAT project to quantify the transfusion transmission (TT) risk from travelling donors.
Methods: A generic model for estimating the TT risk from a group of travelling donors that visited an EID risk area
was developed. In addition, the new model distinguishes projected future transmissions from those that have
already occurred. As an illustration the model was applied to the outbreaks of chikungunya in Italy in 2007 and Q
fever in the Netherlands in 2007–2009.
Results: Formulas for calculating the travelling donors’ TT risk were derived. For the chikungunya outbreak in Italy
an early intervention (at the end of week 7 after the start of the outbreak, so after only 19 % of all cases) would
have been required to prevent only 41 % of all expected transmissions at that time. For Q fever, in which the
transmission of chronic Q fever is considered, even at the end of the third annual outbreak’s peak 47 % of all
(chronic) Q fever transmissions could still be prevented.
Conclusions: The updated model allows estimation of the infection transmission risk from travelling donors. In
combination with the distinction between past and future transmissions, these estimates provide valuable information
to support decisions concerning communication with the public and/or the implementation of safety interventions.
Keywords: Travellers’ risk, Transmission risk, Emerging infectious diseases, Blood transfusion
Background
Trends in globalisation have brought increased blood
safety concerns as population members (and therefore
also blood donors) have become highly mobile. This pre-
sents challenges for blood safety when travellers go to
areas in which there is ongoing transmission of infec-
tious diseases (either endemic or epidemic) and import
infections to their home countries. Blood safety concerns
for emerging infectious diseases (EID) are identified and
documented extensively in the literature [1–4]. Currently
available travellers’ risk models focus mainly on the prob-
ability of travellers acquiring an infection when visiting
high-risk areas [5–7], but do not link this information
directly to its implications for the risk of transmission
by (blood) donors.
Several blood establishments have travel risk pol-
icies for donors who report having visited EID risk
areas [2, 4, 6, 8–10]. Variation in existing policies may
be an indication of the absence of a common understand-
ing and perception of the blood safety risk posed by travel-
lers in their respective home countries. The EUFRAT
(European Up-Front Risk Assessment Tool) project [2]
developed and launched an online risk assessment tool
[11] to help decision-makers assess the EID risk in order
to guide informed decisions concerning an appropriate
course of action. The current tool, however, offers only
limited opportunities for extensively analysing the transfu-
sion transmission (TT) risk from travelling donors.
The aim of this study was to extend EUFRAT to char-
acterise and model the risk of disease transmission from
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travelling donors to blood safety. We propose generic
formulas for calculating the risk of transmission taking
into account transfusions that have already occurred by
the time of observation (past transmissions), and the
projected (future) transmissions from travelling donors.
The method was applied to the chikungunya outbreak in
Italy [2, 10] and the Q fever outbreak in the Netherlands
[12, 13] that have previously been analysed using EUFRAT
for the TT risk among the local residents. We chose the
chikungunya and Q fever examples to illustrate risk esti-
mates for a disease with a short and a long infectious
period.
Methods
Deriving the travellers risk model
For the quantification of the risk of infected donations
from travellers who visited an EID risk area, a number of
definitions are required. These relate to (1) the transmis-
sion in the EID risk area (number of infections notified,
duration of observation, population size), (2) the infection
(duration of the infectious period, proportion of symp-
tomatic and chronic infections), and (3) the travelling
donor population (number of travellers, duration of visits,
donation frequency). Next, based on these definitions, for-
mulas for the expected number of transmissions by blood
transfusion from travellers were derived. A distinction is
made between transmissions that have already occurred
by the end of the observed outbreak (past transmissions)
and for transmissions yet to occur (future transmissions).
The model of a travelling donor entering a risk area,
his exposure, infection and his infectious period is illus-
trated in Fig. 1. A summary of parameters used in the
model is given in Table 1. Details on the derivation of
the formulas can be found in the Additional file 1.
We consider the situation in which a traveller enters
an area with ongoing transmission of an infectious dis-
ease (which we refer to as “risk area”) at time te, where
he remains for a time period Dv after which he returns
to his home country. If he becomes infected he will re-
main infectious for a period Di, and in case he donates
within this time period upon returning home, he is ex-
pected to transmit the infection acquired. Thus, the ex-
posure of the traveller begins upon entering the risk area
at te, and lasts for a period Dv. Because we are interested
in the donations made by the traveller after the end of
his visit Dv, the time being infectious while able to donate
is defined as the time interval from te +Dv to ti +Di. Let
us call this interval Dx(=ti +Di − te −Dv), which is relevant
for transfusion transmission. All time intervals are pre-
sumed to be non-negative.
We assume that transmission in the area during the
risk assessment can be characterised by a constant inci-
dence rate λ ¼ INDo , where I is the number of infections
notified in the time interval Do corrected for underre-
porting, N is the size of the population at risk, and Do is
Fig. 1 Modelling travellers’ risk when visiting a risk area. The key features to note are that travellers’ exposure varies depending on the time of
entry (te) in relation to the start and end of the observation (t= 0, t = tobs =Do). Transmission risk is further affected by the time of getting infected (ti),
and the time of donating (tx) after the travellers’ return to their home country. Transmission will only occur if donation takes place within the remaining
infectious period (Dx). Other factors considered are the duration of the visit Dv, the duration of infectivity Di, and the duration of the observation Do.
Returning donors who have already donated at the end of observation tobs (past transmissions) can obviously not be prevented. Transmissions that are
yet to occur (future transmissions) can be prevented by implementing additional safety interventions
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the period of transmissions observed. For a transmission
where the incidence rate varies over time, the risk can
be estimated for smaller Do intervals with varying inci-
dence rates. These varying incidence rates can be mod-
elled as a series of individual small outbreaks of which
the results can be subsequently aggregated. We next as-
sume that the incidence rate can be interpreted as a
proxy for the force of infection to which a susceptible
traveller is exposed, that a donor will be infected only
once during his visit, that the infection risk is propor-
tional to the duration of stay in the risk area, that τ is
the number of donors per unit time travelling to the risk
area, that φ is the donation rate (which is one divided by
the length of the inter-donation interval Dd), and that
each donation made by each infected donor upon
returning home results in one infected recipient. The
total number of transmissions from travelling donors




















The number of transmissions per infected donor
would generally be proportional to the donation rate (φ)
and the duration of the infectious period (Di). For travel-
ling donors however, half the duration of the visiting
time is subtracted from the infectious period. This
makes sense as donors will not be able to donate during
their visit to the risk area and therefore the infectious
period of a visiting donor will on average be reduced by
half the visiting time.
Table 1 Description of model parameters and their values used in estimating travellers transmission risks for the respective
chikungunya [2, 10] and Q fever [1, 3] outbreaks
Symbol Dimension Description Chikungunya Q fever
I - Number of infections: number of infections in the risk area. 247 837
N - Population size: the size of the local population in the risk area. 3,977,508 55,725
Do = tobs Time Duration of the observation: the time from the 1
st day of reported
cases until the day of the last reported case; or for a series of
observations: the time from the start until the end of each
observation period.
105 days (15 weeks) 1050 days (35 months)
λ ¼ IND0 1/time Incidence rate: the rate of infection accrual in the risk area. 5.9 × 10
−7 per day 1.4 × 10−5 per day
Di Time Duration of infectious period: the time in which a traveller is
infectious.
8 (1–12) days Acute: 14 (10–17) days
Chronic: 12 (3–21) months
Dx Time Duration of infectious donation period: the time in which a traveller
might give blood transfusion during his infectious period after
returning home.
pd - Proportion of donors: the proportion of donors among the general
population.
3.53%a 2.37%a
τ = pdfv 1/time Rate of donors visiting the risk area: this is calculated from a
proportion of donors (pd) among the number of visitors to
the risk area per unit time (fv).
0.35 donors/daya 0.24 donors/daya
φ ¼ 1Dd 1/time Donation rate: number of donations per unit time, this depends on
the inter-donation interval (Dd), i.e. time in between subsequent
donations by donors.
0.005 per daya (Dd = 215) 0.005 per day
a (Dd = 215)
Dv Time Duration of visit: length of stay of visitors in the risk area. 7 days
a 14 daysa
t Time Time: the time since the start of the observation.
te Time Time of donor entry: the time at which a travelling donor arrives in
the risk area within the observation period.
ti Time Time of infectivity: the time at which the travelling donor is presumed
to obtain an infection.
tx Time Time of donation: time at which an individual donor is assumed to
deliver an infected donation.
Nv - Number of transmissions - from travelling donors after returning to
their home country.
Nvf - Number of future transmissions – from travelling donors after the
end of the so far observed transmission, so after time point tobs.
aFictive parameter values or assumptions
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For those cases where te +Dv < tobs, a fraction of the
total number of infected donations are expected to have
already been made at the time of observation tobs. Such
transmissions cannot be prevented any more. The
remaining fraction, however, can potentially be prevented
by an intervention in the blood supply. This remaining
fraction can be determined by splitting the formula into
transmissions occurring before tobs (past), and transmis-
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τλφ ti þ Di−Doð Þdtidte
Thus, the number of future transmissions from travel-
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τλφ ti þ Di−Doð Þdtidte
ð2Þ
For situations in which the infectious period is longer
than the duration of stay (Di ≥Dv), the number of future





















As donors can potentially transmit infection long after
becoming infected (e.g. in the case of chronic infections)
the distinction between past and future transmissions
can be informative. This allows a decision maker to as-
sess the impact of safety interventions and the necessity
for communication of risks to transfusion recipients even
at the end or (long) after an outbreak has occurred.
In situations where Di <Dv and the infection occurs at
the beginning of the visit, so within Dv <Di after entering
the risk area, the infectious period has already passed be-
fore the donor returns home and no transmission will
occur. This means that the duration of exposure with a
risk of transmission had length Di instead of Dv, and the
risk of transmission has to be corrected for the likelihood
of an early infection. The risk of the donor getting infected
in this first period of his visit is equal to λ(Dv – Di). Hence
the number of (future) infected donors can be calculated
using Eqs. 1 and 3 whilst replacing the duration of the visit
by the length of the infectious period (Di) and noting that
the risk is overestimated by a (most likely very small)
factor 1/(1 − λ(Dv −Di)).
The estimated number of infected donations might
have to be adjusted according to the proportion of
under-reporting of notified cases, according to the time
that infected donors will actually donate during their in-
fectious period before symptom onset (referred to as the
critical infectious period in the original EUFRAT model),
or adapted for the infectivity of the specific transfused
product [2]. In addition, if more than one (infectious)
product is derived from one donation, the number of
transmissions will have to be adjusted accordingly.
Application to outbreak data and sensitivity analysis
The travellers’ risk model was applied to the chikungunya
outbreak in Italy in 2007 [2, 10]. We illustrate the risk for
a group of non-Italian travellers, for instance from country
A, who went to Italy during the outbreak and donate upon
return in their home country. The analysis was done using
the reported weekly number of infections in the outbreak
region, corrected for the proportion of asymptomatic in-
fection. To address the variation in incidence rates over
time, the outbreak is modelled as a series of independent
weekly outbreaks; thus the formulas were applied se-
quentially and the resulting estimated transmissions ag-
gregated. To illustrate the sensitivity of the risk estimates
to variation in model parameters, the numbers of transfu-
sion transmissions were calculated for various values for
the duration of stay and for the infectious period.
As a second example the Q fever outbreak, which lasted
for over a 3-year period in the Netherlands, was assessed
for the transmission risk of chronic Q fever in non-Dutch
travellers to the Netherlands [12]. The monthly number of
notified Q fever cases used in the analysis can be found in
Additional file 1: Table S3. Note that the infectivity of
chronic Q fever, in terms of pathogenicity and length of
the infectious period, differs from that of the acute infec-
tion. Also, chronically infected travellers may be less likely
to donate due to their underlying disease/condition (such
as a heart valve abnormalities) [14, 15]. Nevertheless, we
used chronic Q fever transmission to illustrate the risk
from an infection with a long infectivity period. It is
presumed that 2 % of the infections progress to a chronic
infection with an infectious period of 12 months.
Computer software
All formulas were derived using Mathematica (version 9.0.1,
The Wolfram Centre Lower Road, Long Hanborough,
Oxfordshire, United Kingdom). The formulas were im-
plemented in Microsoft Excel (MS Office Professional
Plus 2010, Excel version 14.0, Microsoft Corporation,
One Microsoft Way Redmond, WA 98052–7329 USA)
for analysis and graphing.
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Results
Application to the chikungunya outbreak in Italy
Weekly chikungunya infections reported during the 15-week
outbreak in 2007 in Italy were used to estimate the total
number of transmissions by blood transfusion from travellers
to Italy, as well as the expected proportion of future trans-
missions. The number of chikungunya infections was esti-
mated by adjusting the notified cases for the proportion of
asymptomatic cases (15 %); we used the adjusted value to
allow for a comparison with earlier results. The expected fu-
ture transmissions are shown in Table 2 and Fig. 2 for a sce-
nario in which ten travellers per day (τ= 10) visited the risk
area, remaining in the area for 7 days each (Dv= 7). For this
scenario, the total cumulative (15 weeks) travellers’ transmis-
sion risk is 4.45 per million blood donations from travellers
to Italy. At the end of outbreak week 7, the total number of
expected transmissions is 0.85 per million and the propor-
tion of future transmissions –given that 19 % of all infections
were observed by the end of week 7– is 41 %. Implementa-
tion of interventions like stopping blood collection at this
early stage only would substantially mitigate future transmis-
sions from donors that travelled to the risk area.
Sensitivity analysis
First, the duration of visit was varied. For duration of the
travellers’ visit of 2, 4, and 8 days, the total transmission
risk is equal to 2, 3.4 and 4.5 per million, respectively.
Given that the infectious period is 8 days, the duration of
the visit from 8 days onwards will result in a similar trans-
mission risk for this setting. What can be observed is the
decreasing relative increase in the number of transmis-
sions with increasing visit length as a result of the negative
quadratic term in visit length in Eq. 1. Here one can see
that a four-fold increase in the duration of visit only dou-
bles the risk. Therefore only for (relatively) short visits will
the risk be linear in the duration of visit.
Next, the duration of visit was assessed for an infectious
period of 1 year (365 days). Now the observed transmis-
sion risk becomes 100, 200, 410 and 710 per million for
respective visit lengths of 2, 4, 8 and 14 days. Here it can
be noted that the risk from travelling donors increases al-
most linear with the duration of visit (14/2 × 100 = 700 ≈
710). The proportion of future transmissions at any given
time during and after the outbreak period will be closely
similar for each of these scenarios, as most transmissions
(approximately 87 %) will occur after the end of the ob-
served outbreak.
Application to the Q fever outbreak in the Netherlands
Using the disease parameters from a previous Q fever
study and visit characteristics as provided in Table 1 for
analyses of the chikungunya outbreak, the number of
Table 2 The weekly outbreak notified cases, estimated total number of transmissions by travelling donors, projected future
transmissions and proportion of future transmissions resulting from current infections based on chikungunya outbreak data in Italy
2007 for a 7-day visit [2, 10]
Week number Number of cases Estimated cumulative total number





n In Nv nð Þ ¼
X15
n¼1









1 1 0.01 0.01 74
2 0 0.01 0.00 0
3 1 0.03 0.01 37
4 1 0.04 0.01 25
5 8 0.14 0.08 54
6 10 0.27 0.10 35
7 26 0.61 0.25 41
8 42 1.16 0.40 35
9 38 1.65 0.37 22
10 48 2.27 0.46 20
11 26 2.61 0.25 10
12 25 2.93 0.24 8.2
13 8 3.04 0.08 2.5
14 9 3.16 0.09 2.7
15 4 3.21 0.04 1.2
aFuture transmissions were calculated using the formula given which estimates the number of transmission after the end of the corresponding week as a result of
the observed cases in that week. As the infectious period lasts for 8 days, only 98 % of the future transmissions will actually occur in the week following the observed
cases, and 2 % in the week after that. Therefore the number of future transmissions indicated in the table will on average underestimate the true number of future
transmission by 2 %
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transmissions from donors visiting the risk area in the
Netherlands can be calculated. A constant stream of 10
visitors per day who on average stay for 2 weeks in the
risk area would result in a total of 1.7 per thousand in-
fection transmissions in the home country. Note that
this number is derived directly from the number of noti-
fied cases (presuming 2 % chronic cases), whereas in the
Q fever study the estimate was influenced by a propor-
tion of more than 90 % undetected cases and a 50 %
probability that symptomatic donors were screened out
by the donor health questionnaire. The monthly outbreak
analyses from the high-risk area indicated that at the
annual outbreak peaks in 2007 (month 3, 36 cases),
2008 (month 15, 121 cases) and 2009 (month 27, 159
cases), the percentage of future transmissions are 95, 70
and 47 %, respectively, as shown in Fig. 3.
It is clear that incorporating uncertainty in all model
parameters would allow construction of credible intervals
(CIs) around the estimated number of transmissions.
However, the figures are provided for illustration of the
application of the methodology rather than for estimating
the number of transmissions, hence CIs are not provided.
Discussion
Our study shows that it is feasible to estimate the number
of transmissions from travelling donors by applying the
travellers’ risk model described in this paper. The model
developed can support decision-making concerning safety
interventions and communication related to donors trav-
elling to EID risk areas. The model allows –using only a
few basic parameters related to the outbreak, the infec-
tious disease, and the travelling donor population– esti-
mation of the transmission risk from travelling donors.
For the chikungunya outbreak we noted that the esti-
mated traveller’s risk for a 1 week visit is 0.1 per million
(0.1 infections in 1,000,000 donations made by travellers
to the outbreak region). Liumbruno and colleagues re-
ported that during this outbreak a 21-day deferral pol-
icy was implemented nationally for all donors who had
visited the risk area even for a few hours, although their
acceptable cut-off risk is one in 380,000, which is much
higher than our model’s estimate [10]. Had the travellers’
Fig. 2 The estimated total cumulative number of transmissions, future transmissions and the corresponding proportion of future transmissions at
the time considered. The estimates are based on the chikungunya outbreak in Italy in 2007 [2, 10]. The total number of expected transmissions
(left y-axis) is estimated using the total number of cases notified up until that week (x-axis) of the outbreak. The number of expected future
transmissions (left y-axis) is estimated using the same information, but also incorporates the timing of the occurrence of the infections. The
proportion of future transmissions (right y-axis) is calculated as the ratio of future transmissions to the total number of transmissions estimated
at the end of each week of the outbreak
Fig. 3 The estimated total cumulative number of transmissions, future
transmissions and the corresponding proportion of future transmissions
at the time considered. The estimates are based on the Q fever outbreak
in The Netherlands in 2007–2009 [12]. The total expected number of
transmissions (left y-axis) is estimated using the total number of cases
notified up until that week (x-axis) of the outbreak. The number of
expected future transmissions (left y-axis) is estimated using the same
information, but also incorporates the timing of the occurrence of the
infections. The proportion of future transmissions (right y-axis) is
calculated as the ratio of future transmissions to the total number
of transmissions estimated at the end of each week of the outbreak
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risk model been available at that time, the policy might
have been different. Chikungunya has only a short infec-
tious period of 8 days. Therefore, only a limited number
of future infections are anticipated. The ability of the trav-
ellers risk model to generate the expected number of
future infections allows decision makers to quantify the
potential immediate impact of (in)action on transfusion
safety.
One of the limitations of our model is that it assumes
that travelling donors only visit the risk area once. In
some cases, travellers might make recurring visits and
such repeated exposures might further increase their sus-
ceptibility to infection. This was also noted by Massad and
colleagues [5]. For asymptomatic dengue infections repeat
travel could expose a previously infected traveller to more
severe expressions of illness, which might affect the dona-
tion behaviour of travellers. Data on such travel behaviour
may not be easily available however. Another limitation of
our model is that it presumes fixed donation intensity
whereas donation behaviour is likely not to be constant in
time, especially around periods of travel. When such infor-
mation is available however, there are no restrictions to in-
clude these in modelling the risk of infected donations.
Also, the current model presumes that the infection is
transmissible immediately after infection. However, in case
a disease is only infectious after a particular incubation
time Dc, the risk from such an infection can be calculated
by simply calculating the number of infections that would
have been transmitted if infections would have been trans-
mitted over the full infectious period Di and subtracting
the infections transmitted from the time of infection up
until the incubation time Dc.
We noted that the travellers’ risk model is generally
applicable, and its application is illustrated for two real
outbreaks. Our model, with its distinction between past
and future transmissions, can be considered a useful
extension to currently available models for estimating
transfusion transmission risks. Application of the trav-
ellers’ risk model may assist blood establishments in
harmonising risks posed by travelling donors [9]. Several
studies have shown that travellers do pose a risk [8, 16]
which requires blood authorities to have mechanisms in
place to manage such risks.
The example applications in this paper assumed 100 %
transmissibility of the infection during the infectious
period that will provide conservative risk estimates. The
web based EUFRAT model however allows specification
of the probability of transmission per type of transfusion
product (which are typically red cells, platelets or plasma).
It should be noted that transfusion transmission for
chikungunya has not yet been demonstrated [10], and
for Q fever the single suspected transmission case reported
was not conclusively confirmed [12, 17]. Nevertheless,
despite the unavailability of evidence concerning the
transmission rate, decision-makers would still be inter-
ested in the expected number of transmissions for vari-
ous viable scenarios. Such scenario analyses can only be
conducted if models for calculating the transmission
risks are available.
Conclusions
We have developed a model that allows estimation of
transfusion transmission risk from travelling donors. The
limited number of generic model parameters required
permits the model to be applied in very diverse settings.
This not only empowers public health decision-makers
with an appropriate tool to objectively quantify the risk
from traveling donors, but also provides a sound pro-
active basis for enhanced management and response to
outbreak situations.
Additional file
Additional file 1: Deriving the risk of transfusion transmission from
travelling donors. (DOCX 91 kb)
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